16 TARGET SAIGON 1973-75 - VOLUME 2 - THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM - THE BEGINNING OF THE END JANUARY 1974 - MARCH 1975.pdf

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CONTENTS
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Text © Albert Grandolini 2020
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Canossa, Tom Cooper, Ugo Crisponi,
Anderson Subtil 2020
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ISBN
978-1-914377-49-5
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication
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Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fighting a Poor Man’s War
The Paracel Islands Battle
The Last Offensive into Cambodia
A Rainy Season Like no Other
Truong Saves the I Corps again
Expanding the Liberated Areas
The North Vietnamese Decision to Conquer South Vietnam
Cutting the Gordian Knot
The Road of Blood and Tears
2
2
2
8
12
17
24
35
39
48
69
86
88
Bibliography
About the Author
Note: In order to simplify the use of this book, all names, locations and geographic
designations are as provided in
The Times World Atlas,
or other traditionally accepted major
sources of reference, as of the time of described events.
ASIA@WAR VOLUME 16
Dedication
This book is dedicated to my late parents who passionately loved the Central Highlands of Vietnam, its cloud-covered
mountains, the undulating hills, the coffee plantations and its proud Montagnard tribes.
ABBREVIATIONS
AA
AAA
ACS
AFB
APC
ARVN
ATGM
CBU
CIA
C-in-C
CMC
CO
COSVN
DAO
DMZ
FAC
FSB
GP
HQ
KIA
Km
LST
MANPADS
Anti-Aircraft
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Armoured Cavalry Squadron
Air Force Base
Armoured Personnel Carrier
Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the South
Vietnamese Army
Anti-Tank Guided Missile
Cluster Bomb Unit
Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
Commander-in-Chief
Central Military Commission, of the Politburo
Commanding Officer
Central Office for South Vietnam
Defence Attaché Office
Demilitarized Zone, separating North from
South Vietnam
Forward Air Controller, usually airborne
controller in observation aircraft
Fire Support Base
General-Purpose (bomb)
Headquarters
Killed in Action
Kilometre
Landing Ship Tank
Man-Portable Air Defence System(s) – light
surface-to-air missile system that can be carried
and deployed in combat by a single soldier
MBT
MIA
MR
MRL
NCO
PAVN
PLANAF
POW
PRG
RF/PF
SA-2 Guideline
SA-7 Grail
SAC
SAM
SP
UHF
USMC
USAF
USN
VNAF
VNN
VNMC
WIA
Main Battle Tank
Missing in Action
Military Region
Multiple Rocket Launcher
Non-Commissioned Officer
People’s Army of Vietnam, the North Vietnamese
Army
People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force
Prisoner of War
Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet
Cong)
Regional Forces/People’s Forces from the ARVN
ASCC codename for S-75 Dvina, Soviet SAM
system
ASCC codename for 9K32 Strela-2, Soviet
MANPADS
Strategic Army Corps
Surface-to-Air Missile
Self-Propelled (artillery)
Ultra High Frequency
United States Marine Corps
United States Air Force
United States Navy
Vietnamese Air Force, Air Force of South
Vietnam
Vietnamese Navy, Navy of South Vietnam
Vietnamese Marine Corps
Wounded in Action
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express his special gratitude to all those
individuals who contributed to this book. Specifically, I wish to express
my deepest appreciation to Anthony J. Tambini, Cao Tan Loc, Chau
Huu Loc, Dang Huy Lang, Do Khac Mai, Ha Minh Tay, Ho Dac Du,
Ha Mai Viet, Huynh Sanh Thong, Huynh Ba Phuc, Huynh Thu Thoai,
Jean Dunoyer, Ken Conboy, Le Quang Thuan, Le Xuan Lan, Mai Van
Hai, Marc Koelich, Nguyen Tien Van, Nguyen Xuan Giac, Pham Long
Suu, Pham Quang Khiem, Robert C. Mikesk, Roger Routin, Stephane
Legoff, Ted Koppel, Terry Love, Timothy Keer, Timothy Pham, Tom
Cooper, Tran Tan Tiep, Ung Buu Hoang Nguyen, Vo Ngoc Cac and
Vu Dinh. All of them provided extensive aid in some form of related
research and eventually made this book possible.
1
FIGHTING A POOR MAN’S WAR
On 27 January 1973, peace was finally signed in Paris, creating hopes
that the fighting in Vietnam would stop. In exchange for the return
of prisoners of war, the United States would withdraw its last forces
while the North Vietnamese could maintain their forces in the areas
they controlled in South Vietnam. One year after the so-called ‘Peace
Accords’, the dreams of fighting having ceased were more remote than
ever. Since the departure of US forces, the South Vietnamese had
prevailed against their foe throughout 1973, with combat escalating
from skirmishes to divisional levels (see
Target Saigon
Volume 1), but
at a high cost, while the political roadmap envisaged by the agreements
2
TARGET SAIGON VOLUME 2: THE BEGINNING OF THE END
was at a dead end. The economic
situation had also worsened
for the Saigon government of
President Nguyen Van Thieu,
which desperately believed in the
promises made by Washington
that economic and military aid
would continue to be provided.
But, embroiled in the ‘Watergate
Scandal’, President Richard
Nixon – the strongest supporter
of South Vietnam – could
not counterbalance a hostile
Congress. Already, less than
six months after the American
departure, US military aid had
been reduced and the protocol
of replacing equipment lost on
a one-for-one basis could not be
fulfilled.
Initially, the commander
of the Defence Attaché Office
With the massive American aid reduction, President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam was in a quandary over
(DAO), the organisation in
his strategic stance by mid-1974. Despite some of his advisers suggesting a redeployment of their forces to more
charge of funnelling that aid,
defensible positions, he stubbornly clung to his strategy to not cede territory to the enemy. Consequently, no
serious planning for an orderly withdrawal was done. His change of mind under duress in the spring of 1975 would
Major General John E. Murray,
lead to a catastrophe. (US Army)
wanted to warn the South
Vietnamese of the impending
cutbacks, but was told not to
do that for fear of causing a
slump in their morale. What had
been only an internal US Army
stock management issue, partly
because they had been sucked
dry by urgently furnishing Israel
during the Yom Kippur War,
became a public problem when
Congress officially questioned
the validity of continuing to
support a perceived oppressive
regime. Furthermore, Congress
reasoned that reducing the aid
would force Saigon to lower
the level of combat accordingly,
providing more encouragement
The US aid reduction forced the ARVN to reduce ammunition expenditures. Particularly hard hit by the constraints
for a true ceasefire environment
were artillery units. These tucks are being loaded with 105mm artillery shells at the Cam Ranh military harbour. (US
to develop. They naively put the
Army)
blame solely on the Thieu government, suggesting that he should which involved the ending of the military-dependant shelter-house
resign in favour of representatives of the ‘Third Force’, a disparate building programme, the improvement of lines of communications
group of non-communist opponents, who would reach peace with and a reduction in spare parts procurements for the Vietnamese Air
the totalitarian North Vietnamese Stalinist regime. The US aid ceiling Force (VNAF) and Vietnamese Navy (VNN). They tried to cope with
was consequently reduced from $2.1 billion to $1.1 billion. Even this the already critical shortages of $180 million in ground munitions,
figure was revised down to $900 million by the House Committee in $5 million for medical supplies, $4.3 million for subsistence and $8
December 1973 for the 1974 fiscal year, covering both South Vietnam million for air munitions. A project to purchase additional LST ships
and Laos. The part allowed to Saigon would be $813 million. With for the VNN was abandoned, a decision that would later have grave
about $723 million already obligated, only $90 million remained consequences.
Consequently, the ARVN’s Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen,
to carry the Vietnam Programme for the remaining six months of
the fiscal year. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) had commander of the central Logistic Command, issued strict directives
expended more supplies and munitions in its recent campaigns to to conserve equipment and ammunition. Despite these efforts, by mid-
blunt the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) offensives, a surge in 1974, ARVN stocks of 105mm shells – its main artillery munitions –
spending of over $200 million. Major General Murray persuaded were dangerously low, with only 52 days of supply remaining, and less
the South Vietnamese to implement a $33 million budget saving, if facing a major North Vietnamese offensive. The situation was also
3

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