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The capability approach (also referred to as the capabilities approach) is an economic theory conceived in the 1980s as an approach to welfare economics.[1] In this approach, Amartya Sen brings together a range of ideas that were hitherto excluded from (or inadequately formulated in) traditional approaches to the economics of welfare. The core focus of the capability approach is on what individuals are able to do (i.e., capable of).
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· 1 Assessing capability
· 2 Key terms
o 2.1 Functionings
o 2.2 Capabilities
o 2.3 Agency
· 3 Nussbaum's ten central capabilities
· 4 The measurement of human capabilities
o 4.1 General overview
o 4.2 Women and cultural universals
o 4.3 Monetary vs. nonmonetary measures of well-being
§ 4.3.1 Critique of output-based measures
o 4.4 Shift towards alternative measures
o 4.5 Capabilities-based indices
§ 4.5.1 Human development index
§ 4.5.2 Gender-related development index
§ 4.5.3 Gender empowerment measure
§ 4.5.4 Gender inequality index
§ 4.5.5 Other measures
o 4.6 Alternative measures of well-being
· 5 Contrast with other approaches
o 5.1 Contrast with utility-based or subjective approaches
o 5.2 Contrast with resource-based approaches
· 6 See also
· 7 Notes
· 8 References
· 9 External links
Initially Sen argued for five components in assessing capability:
1. The importance of real freedoms in the assessment of a person's advantage
2. Individual differences in the ability to transform resources into valuable activities
3. The multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to happiness
4. A balance of materialistic and nonmaterialistic factors in evaluating human welfare
5. Concern for the distribution of opportunities within society
Subsequently, and in collaboration particularly with political philosopher Martha Nussbaum, development economist Sudhir Anand and economic theorist James Foster, Sen has helped to make the capabilities approach predominant as a paradigm for policy debate in human development where it inspired the creation of the UN's Human Development Index (a popular measure of human development, capturing capabilities in health, education, and income). In addition, the approach has been operationalised with a high income country focus by Paul Anand and colleagues.[2][3] Furthermore, since the creation of the Human Development and Capability Association in the early 2000s, the approach has been much discussed by political theorists, philosophers and a range of social sciences, including those with a particular interest in human health.
The approach emphasizes functional capabilities ("substantive freedoms", such as the ability to live to old age, engage in economic transactions, or participate in political activities); these are construed in terms of the substantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead of utility (happiness, desire-fulfillment or choice) or access to resources (income, commodities, assets). Poverty is understood as capability-deprivation. It is noteworthy that the emphasis is not only on how human beings actually function but also on their having the capability, which is a practical choice, "to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value".[4] Someone could be deprived of such capabilities in many ways, e.g. by ignorance, government oppression, lack of financial resources, or false consciousness.
This approach to human well-being emphasizes the importance of freedom of choice, individual heterogeneity and the multi-dimensional nature of welfare. In significant respects, the approach is consistent with the handling of choice within conventional microeconomics consumer theory although its conceptual foundations enable it to acknowledge the existence of claims, like rights, which normatively dominate utility-based claims (see Sen (1979)).
In the most basic sense, functionings consist of “beings and doings”.[5] As a result, living may be seen as a set of interrelated functionings. Essentially, functionings are the states and activities constitutive of a person’s being. Examples of functionings can vary from elementary things, such as being healthy, having a good job, and being safe, to more complex states, such as being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. Moreover, Amartya Sen contends that functionings are crucial to an adequate understanding of the capability approach; capability is conceptualized as a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings.[5]
In other words, functionings are the subjects of the capabilities referred to in the approach: what we are capable, want to be capable, or should be capable to be and/or do. Therefore, a person’s chosen combination of functionings, what they are and do, is part of their overall capability set – the functionings they were able to do. Yet, functionings can also be conceptualized in a way that signifies an individual’s capabilities. Eating, starving, and fasting would all be considered functionings, but the functioning of fasting differs significantly from that of starving because fasting, unlike starving, involves a choice and is understood as choosing to starve despite the presence of other options.[5] Consequently, an understanding of what constitutes functionings is inherently tied together with an understanding of capabilities, as defined by this approach.
Capabilities are the alternative combinations of functionings a person is feasibly able to achieve. Formulations of capability have two parts: functionings and opportunity freedom – the substantive freedom to pursue different functioning combinations.[6] Ultimately, capabilities denote a person’s opportunity and ability to generate valuable outcomes, taking into account relevant personal characteristics and external factors. The important part of this definition is the “freedom to achieve”; the reason being, if freedom had only instrumental value – valuable as a means to achieve an end – and no intrinsic value – valuable in and of itself – to a person’s well being, then the value of the capability set as a whole would simply be defined by the value of a person’s actual combination of functionings.[5]
Such a definition would fail to acknowledge the entirety of what a person is capable of being and doing and their resulting current state due to the nature of the options available to them. Consequently, the capability set outlined by this approach is not merely concerned with achievements; rather, freedom of choice, in and of itself, is of direct importance to a person’s quality of life.[5] Take the example of fasting as a functioning; there is an important difference between fasting and starving because, in examining a starving person’s achieved well being, it is critical to consider whether the individual is personally choosing not to eat or whether the person cannot eat because they lack the means to acquire an adequate amount of food.[7]
In this example, therefore, the functioning is starving but the capability to obtain an adequate amount of food is the key element to be considered in evaluating well being between individuals in the two states. In sum, choosing a lifestyle is not exactly the same as having that lifestyle no matter how chosen, and a person’s well being does depend on how that lifestyle came to be.[5] For this reason, while the combination of a person’s functionings represents their actual achievements, their capability set represents their opportunity freedom – their freedom to choose between alternative functioning combinations.[7]
An extension of the capabilities approach has recently been published (2013) in Freedom, Responsibility and Economics of the Person. In this book the authors attempt to explore the interconnected concepts of the person, of responsibility and of freedom in economics and also in moral philosophy and politics. They attempt to reconcile the rationality of the individual and the morality of the person. This book presents a methodological reflexion (phenomenology versus Kantian thought) with the aim of rehumanising the person (through actions, but also through the values and norms that lead to a set of corresponding rights and obligations that have to ordered). Freedom, Responsibility and Economics of the Person is an extension – albeit in a rather critical form - of the capabilities approach; in particular the book discusses the concept of freedom (this does not refer back to a rationality of choice as claimed by Sen’s defenders). Sen’s capability approach accepts freedom but as a prisoner of a purely functional freedom. Such a concept does not take into consideration the capacity of people to apply moral constraints to themselves (i.e. responsibility).
Agency is best understood via Amartya Sen’s description of an agent, defining an agent as someone who acts and brings about change, whose achievement can be evaluated in terms of his or her own values and objectives.[7] This differs from the more common use of the expression “agent” sometimes used in the literature of economics and game theory to signify a person who is acting on someone else’s behalf.[7] Furthermore, agency focuses on the ability to personally choose the functionings one values, a choice that may not always correlate with personal well being. For example, when a person chooses to engage in fasting, they are exercising their ability to pursue a goal they value, though such a choice may not positively affect physical well-being. Amartya Sen explains that a person as an agent need not be guided by a pursuit of well being; agency achievement considers a person’s success in terms of their pursuit of the totality of their considered goals and objectives.[5]
Therefore, a key difference exists between “the agency aspect” and “the well being aspect” of a person. Moreover, for the purposes of the capability approach, agency primarily refers to an individual’s role as a member of society and the public, with the ability to participate in economic, social, and political actions. Agency...
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