OC370_Leyte_Gulf_1944_1.pdf

(15159 KB) Pobierz
LEYTE GULF 1944 (1)
The Battles of the Sibuyan Sea and Samar
MARK STILLE
ILLUSTRATED BY JIM LAURIER
CAMPAIGN 370
LEYTE GULF 1944 (1)
The Battles of the Sibuyan Sea and Samar
MARK STILLE
ILLUSTRATED BY JIM LAURIER
Series editor Nikolai Bogdanovic
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Origins of the campaign
n
Preliminary operations
4
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
United States Navy
n
Imperial Japanese Navy
8
10
OPPOSING FORCES
United States Navy
n
Imperial Japanese Navy
n
Orders of battle
15
OPPOSING PLANS
The American plan
n
The Japanese plan
31
THE BATTLE
The Air Battle off Formosa
n
Sho-1
is activated
n
Ambush at Palawan
n
The Japanese air attacks
The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea
n
Kurita’s indecision
n
The Battle off Samar
Kurita’s controversial decision
n
The flight of the First Diversion Attack Force
The advent of the kamikaze
37
AFTERMATH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
91
94
95
INTRODUCTION
For a number of reasons, the Battle of Leyte Gulf has achieved mythical
status. Perhaps most obviously, the battle was the largest naval encounter
of all time. The United States Navy (USN) brought over 220 combatants
(destroyer size and larger) into the battle arrayed in two fleets. One of these
was the most powerful naval force on the planet. The Third Fleet included
the USN’s Fast Carrier Force with 16 fleet and light carriers, and a phalanx
of escorts including six of the most powerful battleships in the world.
Compared to the Third Fleet, the Seventh Fleet may have lacked striking
power, but it was still a significant force with six older battleships and 18
escort carriers assigned to cover the invasion force of 420 amphibious ships
carrying 132,400 men bound for the island of Leyte. The Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) made a supreme effort to turn back the American invasion of the
Philippines. This translated into a combined force of some 69 combatants,
broken down into four main forces. Among the ships participating were the
two Yamato-class battleships (the largest battleships ever built), the IJN’s
seven other surviving battleships, along with the IJN’s 14 remaining heavy
cruisers. Most of these heavy ships were concentrated into a single force and
given the mission of breaking into Leyte Gulf and destroying the American
invasion fleet.
If only the size of the forces committed to the battle were considered,
this would be enough to generate endless fascination. It is also the array
of different types of combat that makes the
Battle of Leyte Gulf so interesting. Among
these are the last battleship duel in history, the
first organized kamikaze attacks, three major
surface battles, and the heaviest air attacks
on ships at sea in naval history. In addition,
the battle was extraordinarily complex with
four major battles fought in the span of only
two days. The interrelated nature of the main
encounters made for intense controversy. As
the complex and seemingly hopeless Japanese
plan unfolded, the USN’s Third Fleet was
drawn to the north. This opened the door
for the IJN’s force of battleships and heavy
cruisers to charge into Leyte Gulf and gain
victory. On the verge of seeming victory,
the Japanese inexplicably turned back. The
Almost half of TU 77.4.3 (“Taffy
3”) is visible in this single image
taken from
Kalinin Bay.
In the
foreground is
Gambier Bay;
behind her is another escort
carrier and two destroyer
escorts making smoke.
4
enduring myth that the Japanese were close to victory is the most erroneous
among the many myths surrounding the battle.
This is the first of two Osprey Campaign titles covering the battle. In this
book, the focus is on the operations of the IJN’s First Diversion Attack Force
as it made its way to Leyte Gulf. This trek included two major battles – the
Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on October 24, 1944 when the Japanese came
under concerted air attack from the Third Fleet, and the Battle off Samar
the following day, as the still-powerful First Diversion Attack Force headed
south toward Leyte Gulf.
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
After slow advances in the South Pacific for the second half of 1942 and
most of 1943, the growing strength of the USN allowed it to open a second
line of advance in the Central Pacific in late 1943. This was the USN’s
preferred strategy, in no small measure because it was a Navy operation led
by Admiral Chester Nimitz, unlike the advance through the South Pacific and
New Guinea that was under the strategic direction of Army General Douglas
MacArthur. The outline for a two-front offensive against the Japanese was
approved at the Trident Conference held in Washington DC on May 12–17,
1943 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from the United States and the United
Kingdom. Landings were conducted in the Gilbert Islands in November
1943 and were followed by the invasion of the Marshalls in January and
February 1944. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the Allied
leaders embraced the advantages of the Central Pacific drive and the benefits
of seizing the Mariana Islands in particular. An invasion of the Marianas was
scheduled for October 1944.
As the American advance quickened, the debate between Nimitz and
MacArthur on its future direction became more heated. At a February and
March 1944 planning conference in Washington DC, MacArthur’s staff
fought for an advance along northern New Guinea into Mindanao in the
Philippines. Admiral Ernest King and Nimitz wanted the Central Pacific
drive as the primary focus. Nimitz proposed a timetable for the remainder
of the year, which was later adopted. It called for the Japanese Central Pacific
bastion at Truk to be bypassed, Saipan in the Marianas to be attacked by June
15, and landings on the Palau Islands on October 1. On March 12, 1944,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive that combined Nimitz’s short-term
schedule and MacArthur’s longer-term goal of invading Mindanao. Truk
would be bypassed, allowing the invasion of the Marianas to commence on
June 15. Following this, the next targets were the Palaus in mid-September
and Mindanao in mid-November.
Both Nimitz’s and MacArthur’s advances made considerable progress in
the first part of 1944. In the Central Pacific, Saipan was invaded on June
15. This prompted the IJN to commit its carrier force for the first time since
October 1942 to repel the invasion and defeat the USN in a decisive battle.
The result was the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which was the largest carrier
battle of the war, and a decisive victory for the USN. The IJN’s carrier force
was smashed, losing almost 400 aircraft, almost all its trained aviators, and
three carriers in the process. Defeat was so comprehensive that the IJN’s
carrier force would not be ready for the next major American advance in the
5

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika:

Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin