Hidalgo Serna E., The Philosophy of Ingenium ... Gracian.pdf

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The
Philosophy
of
'Ingenium':
Concept
and
Ingenious
Method
in
Baltasar
Gracian
Author(s):
Emilio
Hidalgo
Serna
and
Oliver
Olson
Source:
Philosophy
&
Rhetoric,
Vol.
13,
No.
4
(Fall,
1980),
pp.
245-263
Published
by:
Penn
State
University
Press
Stable
URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237162
Accessed:
06-12-2015
04:11
UTC
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The
Philosophy
of
Ingenium:
Concept
and
Ingenious
Method
in
Baltasar
Gracian1
Emilio
Hidalgo
Serna
Every
human
undertaking
arises
from
a
certain
set
of
historical
circumstances.
The
impetus
for
this
essay
is
the
recent
discussion
of
the
notion
of
ingenium
at
congresses
on
Giambattista
Vico
in
New
York
and
Venice,
especially
by
Ernesto
Grassi
and
Donald
Verene.
I
propose
to
carry
the
discussion
a
step
further
by
exam­
ining
the
place
of
ingenium
in
the
work
of
the
Spanish
Jesuit,
Baltasar
Gracian
(1601-1658),
for
whom
the
concept
is
also
a
central
concern.
In
the
discussion
of
Gracian’s
Agudeza
y
arte
de
ingenio
of
1642
the
critics
reduced
the
implications
of
ingenium
to
purely
formal
and
aesthetic
aspects.
For
Menendez
y
Pelayo
the
work
embodies
“the
codex
of
poetic
intellectualism.”2
Croce
adjudges
Gracian
a
theoretician
of
literary
conceptismo,
whose
principle,
in
his
opin­
ion,
is
“the
literary
form
considered
as
ingenious
and
pleasant
ornament,
added
to
the
naked
expression
of
thought.”3
But
I
do
not
believe
that
ingenium
and
its
concepts
can
be
so
easily
rele­
gated
to
the
category
of
mere
formal
and
decorative
additions
to
rational
expression.
According
to
Gracian,
ingenium
comprehends
the
true
es­
sence
of
things
by
taking
into
account
the
relationships
and
differences
between
them.
For
this
reason
it
is
necessary
before
analyzing
the
method
of
ingenium
to
discuss
briefly
the
tradi­
tional
Aristotelian
logic.
When
the
two
thought
structures
have
been
contrasted
and
we
can
differentiate
between
them
we
shall
be
able
to
understand
more
clearly
the
characteristics
of
inge­
nium
as
a
method
of
cognition.
1.
The
Rational
Method
and
the
Rational
Concept
in
the
Philosophy
of
Aristotle.
It
is
agreed
generally
that
Aristotelian
and
traditional
logic
revolve
around
the
concept.
R.
Verneaux,
for
example,
says,
“The
basis
of
classical
logic
is
the
theory
of
the
concept.
It
pre­
supposes
realism.”4
And
C.
Prantl
observes,
“The
concept
is
the
Philosophy
and
Rhetoric,
Vol.
13,
No.
4,
Fall
1980.
Published
by
the
Pennsylva­
nia
State
University
Press,
University
Park
and
London.
245
246
THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
INGENIUM
principle
of
Aristotelian
logic.”5
Since
it
is
in
the
concept6
that
the
encounter
between
Aristotle’s
logic
and
his
ontology
takes
place,
it
would
not
be
proper
to
deal
only with
the
Organon
and
neglect
the
Metaphysics.
Further,
in
the
concept
can
be
perceived
the
key
to
the
force
and
extent
of
the
rational
method.
Only
in
the
concept
(horos),
taking
as
a
point
of
departure
the
expressed
or
expounded
concept
(logos),
can
the
true
nature
of
the
premiss
(protasis),
the
syllogism
(syllogismos),
the
demonstration
(apo-
deixis),
and
demonstrative
knowledge
(episteme
apodeiktike)
be
arrived
at.7
Aristotle’s
definition
of
“concept”
is
the
following:
“that
into
which
the
premiss
can
be
analyzed,
viz.,
the
predicate
and
the
subject,
with
the
addition
or
removal
of
the
verb
to
be
or
not
to
be.”8
This
definition
is
somewhat
ambiguous
and
inexact.
It
is
significant
that
Aristotle
did
not
leave
us
any
tractate
which
deals
specifically
with
the
key
elements
of
his
logic.9
In
books
I,
II,
and
VI
of
the
Prior
Analytics
the
expression,
horos,
occurs
twenty
times.10
Translators
of
the
book
into
Latin
and
into
modern
languages
have
made
use
of
three
renderings
of
the
word,
which
they
have
used
without
distinction—“term,”
“concept,”
and
“definition.”
Especially
interesting
is
the
etymo­
logical
and
semantic
relationship
between
“concept”
(horos)
and
“definition”
(horismos).
The
close
relationship
between
these
two
words
and
between
“concept”
and
“term,”
in
the
sense
of
“fixed,”
and
“delineated,”
becomes
evident
from
the
derivation
from
horizo
and
the
middle
form
of
the
same
word,
horizomai.
Moerbeke
translates
horizo
as
determino
(to
limit,
restrict)
and
as
termino
(to
divide,
terminate,
finish).
The
verb,
horizomai
(fix,
define,
explain)
expresses
a
somewhat
sharper
delimitation
and
is
translated
as
definio.n
But
if
the
Aristotelian
concept
is
a
defini­
tion
of
being,
positive
or
negative,
the
essential
character
and
original
goal
of
this
knowledge
would
involve
a
restriction
of
being;
it
is
thus
possible
to
comprehend
being
and
to
define
it,
in
order
to
know
it
better.
Aristotle
says,
“All
men
by
nature
desire
to
know
(eidenai),”
and
he
adds,
“knowledge
and
understanding
belong
to
art
rather
than
to
experience,”13
because
“experience
is
knowledge
of
indi­
viduals
[hekaston},
but
art
is
perception
of
the
universal
[katholou}.”™
Aristotle,
of
course,
strives
to
attain
knowledge
of
EMILIO
HIDALGO
SERNA
247
the
universal,
that
is,
demonstrative
knowledge,
which
may
make
the
claim
of
having
perceived
the
basis
(dioti)
and
the
cause
(ten
aitian)
of
things.15
Taking
philosophy
as
wisdom,
he
writes,
“clearly
then
wisdom
is
knowledge
about
certain
principles
and
causes.”16
If
the
goal
of
this
knowledge
is
to
be
the
universal,
it
follows
that
the
Aristotelian
concept
on
which
such
cognition
is
based
will
also
be
universal
and
abstract
and,
thus,
rational,
that
is,
neither
imaginative
nor representative
of
the
individual
and
the
unique
res.
In
this
realm
of
rational
knowledge
is
realized
all
learning
(mathesis)
by
means
of
previous
knowledge,
as
well
as
learning
by
means
of
demonstration
(apodeixeos)
and
learning
by
defini­
tions
(horismon).
The
same
is
true
of
learning
through
induction
(epagoges).11
But
when
knowledge
presupposes
other
knowledge,
in
the
same
way
as
the
conclusion
presupposes
the
premisses,
how
and
where
does
this
previous
knowledge
emerge,
and
how
valid
is
it?
On
what
are
the
premisses
based?
The
premiss
is
“an
affirmative
or
negative
statement
(logos)
of
something
about
some
subject”18
and
this
logos
as
an
expressed
concept
of
horos,
or
the
content
of
the
concept
is,
like
the
proof
of
an
“ultimate
faith”
(eschate
doxa),
based
on
a
first
and
ultimate
principle
(arche):
the
principle
of
contradiction.
This
principle,
which
in
itself
is
something
defined,
therefore
needs
no
proof;
“for
this
principle
according
to
its
nature
is
at
the
same
time
the
princi­
ple
of
the
other
axioms.”19
Determining
the
premisses,
the
princi­
ple
of
contradiction
fixes
the
concepts
and
their
generative
ability
and
at
the
same
time
circumscribes
them.
Rational
Aristotelian
knowledge
is
based
ultimately
not
only
on
this
principle
of
contra­
diction
but
also
on
other
principles
or
a
priori
presuppositions.
It
is
possible
to
discover
the
rational
and
universal
nature
of
the
concept
in
direct
relationship
with
reason.
In
Aristotelian
concepts
the
essences
of
things
and
such
expressions
are
reduc­
tions
or
generalizations
of
that
which
reason
presupposes
and
determines
as
essential
in
things.
The
being
of
things,
that
is,
their
substance,
is
identical
with
their
essence.
But
if
rational
cognition
remains
limited
to
its
essence,
since
“to
know
each
thing,
at
least
is
just
to
know
its
essence,”20
then
we
would
say
that
reason’s
knowledge
is
concerned
only
with
the
universal
in
248
THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
INGENIUM
essences.
Thereby
reason
forgets
the
extraordinary
and
the
con­
crete
and
in
its
concepts
expresses
only
genus
and
species.
Aris­
totle
adds
that
“for
both
the
essence
and
the
universal
and
the
genus
are
thought
to
be
the
substance
of
each
thing.”21
Posses­
sion
of
the
truth
of
being,
that
is,
the
goal
of
all
knowledge,
seems
to
us
impossible
in
the
framework
of
the
Aristotelian
method.
Reason,
commencing
with
universal
concepts
and
with
the
assistance
of
laws
and
principles
which
need
no
proof,
be­
cause
they
are
accepted
a
priori,
is
unable
to
represent
the
unique
truth
of
things.
Within
this
cognitive
structure
nothing
proves
clearer
than
the
universal
character
of
the
concept,
since
this
horos
expresses
it­
self
about
substances
which,
like
the
genus,
have
been
conceived
of
as
universal
(Cf.
Meta.
1069a,
26-27).
Aristotle
proclaims
that
“knowledge
is
of
universals”22
and
builds
on
universal
principles.
In
his
philosophical
search
for
first
principles
and
for
the
causes
of
substances,
he
insists
on
the
art
of
the
universal:
“since
the
science
of
the
philosopher
treats
of
being
qua
being
universally
and
not
in
respect
to
a
part
of
it.”23
In
spite
of
the
“logical
purity”
and
the
“model
strictness”
of
the
Prior
Analytic,
24
deduc­
tive
and
rational
knowledge,
commencing
with
universals,
is
not
able
to
make
known
the
real.
The
same
is
true
if
“it
is
from
universal
premises
that
the
syllogism
proceeds.”25
In
that
case
nothing
new
will
be
produced
in
the
conclusion.
That
means
that
nothing
can
be
expressed
which
is
not
either
affirmed
or
presup­
posed
already
in
the
premisses.
This
sort
of
logic
does
not
lead
to
inventio,
for
in
the
framework
of
deductive
method
invention
is
not
possible.
The
value
and
the
character
of
difference
(diaphora)
in
the
Aristotelian
system
derives
from
the
verbal
root
common
to
the
concept
(horos)
and
the
definition
(horismos).
The
philosopher
asserts,
“clearly
the
definition
is
the
formula
which
comprises
the
differentiae.
But
it
is
also
necessary
that
the
division
be
by
the
differentia
of
the
differentia.
”26
Apparently
what
is
at
stake
here
is
not
real,
but
only
logical
and
rational
differences
between
things.
If
we
affirm
that
“man
is
a
rational
animal,”
the
differ­
ence
is
expressed
in
the
concept
“rational,”
whereby
“rational”
is
to
be
understood
as
the
species
or
the
specific
difference.

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