Osprey - Duel 42 - DH 2 vs Albatros D I-D II. Western Front 1916.pdf

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DH 2
ALBATROS D I/D II
Western Front 1916
JAMES F. MILLER
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
DH 2
ALBATROS D I/D II
Western Front 1916
JAMES F. MILLER
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chronology
Design and Development
Technical Specifications
The Strategic Situation
The Combatants
Combat
Statistics and Analysis
Aftermath
Further Reading
Index
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INTRODUCTION
While modern air forces employ time-tested, combat-proven tactics and decades-old
aeroplanes designed on well understood aeronautical principles and built with ample
time for testing and refining, air forces of World War I were literally writing the book
on tactics and aeroplane design as dictated by the current state of the war. Indeed,
throughout the conflict a perpetual reactionary arms race existed to counter and
hopefully conquer the enemy’s latest aeroplane technology. Nowhere was this more
evident than with single-seat scouts.
Better known today as ‘fighter aeroplanes’, single-seat scouts were born as a direct
result of two-seater aerial reconnaissance and artillery observation. Such infantry
cooperation aeroplanes were crucial for the furtherance of army strategic and tactical
planning for ground force success. This was particularly the case on the static Western
Front, where trench-based warfare throttled any cavalry-based reconnaissance.
Without exaggeration, two-seater photographic reconnaissance was as important in
World War I as satellites are today.
Naturally, it became desirable for all combatants not only to amass as much
intelligence as possible via two-seater excursions over the frontlines but to
simultaneously prevent the enemy from achieving the same. This begat two-seater
crews arming themselves for aerial interception of their belligerent counterparts, but
soon single-seat ‘scouts’ were developed to use speed to dash quickly over the lines,
conduct a specific observation, and then quickly regain the lines. However, both
sides realised that single-seat scouts provided an effective means with which to hunt
and shoot down enemy reconnaissance aeroplanes, as well as to protect their own
reconnaissance types from similar treatment. A natural result of these tactical
implementations was scout-versus-scout combat – the ‘fighter aeroplane’ and
‘dogfighting’ were born.
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However, the superiority pendulum swung without equality as each side strove to
counter what the enemy already possessed. The Germans struck first with their Fokker
Eindeckers, armed with a single Maxim machine gun that was synchronised to fire
through the propeller arc. Not necessarily an extremely nimble aeroplane – it did not
have to be when pursuing sluggish two-seater reconnaissance types such as the Royal
Aircraft Factory (RAF) BE 2c – the monoplane’s armament and speed (approximately
88mph compared to the BE 2c’s modest 69mph at 10,000ft) allowed it to plunder
Allied reconnaissance machines. This in turn gave rise to the legendary ‘Fokker
Scourge’ description given to German air superiority over the Western Front from
late 1915 through to early 1916.
As yet the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia) had no reliable
synchronisation gear with which to counter the new threat. However, the single-seat
French Nieuport 11 ‘Bebe’ soon appeared with a single Lewis machine gun mounted
atop the upper wing that fired
over
the propeller arc, bypassing the need for propeller
synchronisation.
The British answer to the problem was to employ the ‘pusher’ aeroplane concept
– i.e. locate the engine behind the cockpit to allow the pilot freedom to fire a machine
gun forward without any interference from the propeller. This arrangement had
previously been used in two-seaters such as the Farman F 40 and RAF FE 2b, but the
Aircraft Manufacturing Company’s DH 2 was the first single-seat pusher designed
specifically for air-to-air interdiction.
Now equipped with fighters that were as fast and more nimble than the German
monoplanes and, crucially, available in greater numbers, the Entente had once again
No. 24 Sqn DH 2s 6000
(left) and 5925 (right) at
Bertangles in July 1916 –
note 5925’s slightly lower
nacelle front. This aircraft was
one of three DH 2s involved
in an epic clash with
Jasta
2
that saw the loss of No. 24
Sqn CO Maj Lanoe Hawker.
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