Osprey ACM 016 Legion Condor 1936 1939 The Luftwaffe develops Blitzkrieg in the Spanish Civil War By James S Corum True PDF.pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
LEGION CONDOR
1936–39
The Luftwaffe develops
Blitzkrieg
in the Spanish Civil War
JAMES S. CORUM
|
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y G R A H A M T U R N E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
LEGION CONDOR
1936–39
The Luftwaffe develops
Blitzkrieg
in the Spanish Civil War
JAMES S. CORUM |
ILLUSTR AT ED BY GR AHAM TURNE R
CONTENTS
ORIGINS
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKERS’ CAPABILITIES
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
THE CAMPAIGN
ASSESSMENT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
4
22
26
42
47
86
94
95
4
ORIGINS
ORIGINS
From the airlift to Madrid
The trimotor Junkers Ju 52
came into service in 1932
as a civilian transport. The
Ju 52 was easily modified
into a bomber and, as it
was already in
production, it was used by
the Luftwaffe as a bomber
until purpose-built aircraft
like the He 111 became
available. The Ju 52
bomber carried the
bombardier in a special
pod that was lowered
from the aircraft. The
Ju 52 carried 1,500kg of
bombs. (Author’s
collection)
By 1936 Spain had become divided into two nations. One of these was conservative, Catholic
and Nationalist. This side included Spain’s small businessmen and landowners. There were
large factions arguing for the return of the monarchy and these had formed militia forces,
especially in the northern province of Navarre. The 1930s had also seen the rise of a large
Fascist party, the Falange, modelled on Mussolini’s example in Italy. The other Spain was a
coalition of forces that held the majority in the Spanish parliament. These included socialists,
radical socialists, anarchists, progressives and assorted liberals who were supported strongly
by the labour unions and the poor tenant farmers. Spain had a small but well-organized
Communist party as well, and this faction was quickly winning adherents.
Since the defeat of an attempted right-wing coup d’état in 1932, the two Spains became
ever more polarized. By summer of 1936 right-wing forces led by a coalition of army
generals were deep in planning for a national uprising. The uprising itself was triggered
on 13 July 1936 when Calvo Sotelo, the leader of right-wing opposition in the Spanish
parliament, was arrested and then assassinated by the government police. A few days later,
on 16–17 July 1936, much of the Spanish Army, backed by an assortment of monarchists,
conservatives and Fascists, went into open revolt against the Republic. The Nationalist
rebellion was led by a small junta of generals. General José Sanjurjo, who had led the
attempted rightest coup in 1932 and was imprisoned and then amnestied by the government,
lived in exile in Portugal and was the most senior of the coup plotters. Another senior officer
was General Emilio Mola, a decorated veteran of the North African wars who had served as
the governor-general and commandant in Pamplona, Navarre. Mola had developed excellent
contacts with the large monarchist movement in northern Spain. The third senior leader of
the Nationalist junta was General Francisco Franco, at 44 the youngest of the top leaders.
Franco was one of the best known and most successful generals in the Spanish Army. He
had remained generally aloof from politics, and stayed away from earlier coup attempts
and revolutionary activity, but had fallen under the suspicion of the Republic’s government
5
and been sent far away to the Canary Islands to
serve as commander there. However, Franco was
also an exceptionally capable officer and was the
most highly decorated combat commander in
the Spanish Army. He was a battlefield soldier
known for his bravery and coolness under fire
when he fought in the North African wars. He
had been wounded several times and had, in
turn, been the youngest captain, major, colonel
and general in the Spanish Army. (He was
promoted to general at age 33.) From 1923 to
1927 he had commanded the Spanish Foreign
Legion during the Rif War in Morocco. When
the coup began, Franco’s mission was to fly on
the night of 16/17 July from the Canary Islands
to North Africa to raise the garrison there to
support the coup. Not only was Franco well-
known in North Africa, but gaining control
of the Spanish Army of Africa was key to the
Nationalists’ hopes of taking Spain.
The Spanish Peninsular Army was, for the
most part, a poorly trained force with obsolete
equipment and far too many ageing officers. In
1936 it consisted of about 100,000 men. The
police forces of the Spanish Republic, which
included the Civil Guards and the Assault Police,
were another 60,000 men. The army on the
Spanish mainland and Civil Guards were split in
their sympathies, with about half of these forces
going to each side. However, the Nationalists
had an advantage in terms of securing Army
support in that the vast majority of officers were
supportive of the Nationalist coup, and in the
area controlled by the government many of the officers either fled or were arrested. The
small air force split with about 150 of the pilots staying loyal to the government and about
100 going over to the rebels. The Navy enlisted crewmen distrusted their officers, and when
the coup began they arrested and executed officers suspected of Nationalist loyalties. Some
warships did fall to the Nationalists, but the Spanish Navy’s most powerful units, including
the battleship
Jaime I,
sided with the government.
The one really effective military force in Spain – well-trained, well-equipped, and
possessing considerable combat experience – was the Army of Africa, a largely volunteer
force honed by decades of hard colonial campaigns in Spanish Morocco. The Army of Africa
consisted of 20,000 long-term volunteers recruited from the Moroccans and a few thousand
professional soldiers of the Spanish Foreign Legion. Ten thousand troops of the Peninsular
Army were also stationed in Spanish Morocco. These approximately 35,000 troops included
many officers, NCOs and enlisted men who were veterans of the Rif War of the 1920s. If
these forces could be won over to the coup and transported to mainland Spain, they would
be far superior to any government force put in their way.
However, the plan in the first days of the coup was for the rebels to seize power in the
major Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona. On the very first day of the coup, this was
attempted by army and police units. But they were defeated when the government armed the
General Francisco Franco.
It was Franco who sent
representatives to
Germany and Italy to
obtain support for the
Nationalist cause.
(Author’s collection)

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