Osprey CAM 346 Yalu River 1950 1951 The Chinese spring the trap on MacArthur By Clayton K S Chun True Pdf.pdf

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YALU RIVER 1950–51
The Chinese spring the trap on MacArthur
CLAYTON K. S. CHUN
ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE
CAMPAIGN 346
YALU RIVER 1950–51
The Chinese spring the trap on MacArthur
CLAYTON K.S. CHUN
ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE
Series editor Marcus Cowper
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
United Nations
n
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
n
People’s Republic of China
4
6
8
OPPOSING FORCES
United Nations
n
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
n
People’s Republic of China
Orders of battle, October 1950
12
OPPOSING PLANS
United Nations
n
The DPRK and the PRC
19
THE CAMPAIGN
Crossing the 38th Parallel, October 7–20, 1950
n
X Corps’ landings at Wonsan and Iwon,
October 17–29
n
The fall of Pyongyang, October 15–20
n
Reaching the Yalu, October 20–23
The Chinese First Phase Offensive, October 19–November 5
n
The east: US X Corps pushes north,
October 25–November 25
n
The Chinese Second Phase Offensive, November 25–December 24
The Chinese Third Phase Offensive, December 31, 1950–January 8, 1951
24
AFTERMATH
UNCOM’s counteroffensive, January–April 1951
85
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
91
94
95
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Following the Korean People’s Army (KPA) invasion of South Korea in
June 1950, Republic of Korea (ROK) units and supporting Eighth US
Army (under Lieutenant-General Walton Walker) and United Nations
forces (under the overall command of Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command General Douglas MacArthur) found themselves penned
into the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter in the southeast corner of the peninsula.
United Nations forces (including the reactivated US I Corps and IX Corps)
massed in Pusan port and used their dominant navy and aviation assets to
force a collapse in the attacking KPA units in early September. Operation
Chromite
was launched on September 15, a surprise amphibious assault
on the largely undefended city of Inch’on. The highly successful landings
were followed by a cautious, 11-day-long, 20-mile advance on the South
Korean capital Seoul, which was recaptured on September 25. Within
a month of the Inch’on landings, some 135,000 KPA troops had been
taken prisoner.
The September 1950 Inch’on
amphibious landings were
instrumental in forcing Kim
Il-Sung’s KPA to retreat north
of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur
took a calculated risk to send
the X Corps’ 1st Marine Division
and 7th Infantry Division
behind enemy lines, but it
caught the KPA by surprise. (US
Marine Corps)
4
With the recapture of Seoul, questions were raised
about the strategic direction of the war. UN forces could
advance to the 38th Parallel and halt there, mopping
up any remaining KPA forces within ROK territory.
This would restore the peninsula to its prewar borders.
However, a larger vision was growing at MacArthur’s
Tokyo headquarters. Could UN forces settle the question
of a politically divided Korean peninsula by pushing into
Kim Il-Sung’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) and advancing to the Chinese border at the Yalu
River? The DPRK’s defeat appeared imminent. The latter
would demonstrate to Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and Josef Stalin’s Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics (USSR) that the Free World would not tolerate
military aggression and there would be a price to pay for
any such acts.
Advancing to the Yalu River posed significant risks.
The conflict could widen, drawing in both the PRC and
the DPRK’s principal backer, the USSR. The latter had expanded its military
capability, was rapidly developing nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems, and in the West was consolidating its grip on Central and Eastern
Europe satellite states. Any expansion in the Korean conflict could spark
tension not only in Asia, but in Europe and beyond. Given the PRC’s focus
on the Taiwan Problem and its own internal challenges, a PRC intervention
in the DPRK was considered a low risk, certainly by the US military and
political leadership. However, the threat posed to Chinese territorial integrity
and to its economic reconstruction would prove otherwise.
The Korean War was a major challenge to the fledgling UN. The
ROK received political and military support principally from the USA,
Great Britain, and several Commonwealth countries in mid-1950, but
the political decision-making relationships were shared between several
international centers. This was further complicated with military leaders
communicating between these centers and the field. Another concern was
the fragile civil–military relationship between President Harry S. Truman,
as commander-in-chief of America’s armed
forces, and Commander-in-Chief UNCOM
Douglas MacArthur. Even the military
chain of command between MacArthur
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of
the Army, and Army Chief of Staff required
extensive staff coordination that resulted
in misunderstanding and confrontation.
MacArthur himself not only led the UN
forces on the peninsula, but also US air,
land, and naval forces assigned to the
Far East; governed occupied Japan; and
oversaw other potential conflict areas
such as Taiwan. He also had his own
vision, objectives, and goals that differed
greatly from those of Truman, other United
Nations members, and his subordinates.
ROK soldiers drag a wounded
DPRK soldier from a hiding
place on the Pohang front, in
September 1950. (Bettman/
Getty Images)
US 1st Cavalry Division troops
fire on retreating KPA soldiers
at Waegwan, South Korea in
September 1950. (US Army)
5

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