Osprey DUE 101 British Battleship vs Italian Battleshi By Mark Stille True PDF.pdf

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BRITISH BATTLESHIP
ITALIAN BATTLESHIP
The Mediterranean 1940–41
MARK STILLE
BRITISH BATTLESHIP
ITALIAN BATTLESHIP
The Mediterranean 1940–41
MARK STILLE
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chronology
Design and Development
The Strategic Situation
Technical Specifications
The Combatants
Combat
Analysis
Aftermath
Bibliography
Index
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8
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70
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INTRODUCTION
The battle for control of the Mediterranean Sea was the longest campaign involving
naval, air and ground forces of World War II. At various stages, it involved the navies
of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy and Germany. Although
World War II had been under way since 1 September 1939, hostilities in the
Mediterranean did not begin until Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940. Just 12 days
later, France signed an armistice with Germany and dropped out of the Allied powers
facing Germany and Italy. This left the United Kingdom to carry the fight alone
against the Axis in the Mediterranean. Initially, Italy fought largely alone in the
Mediterranean but as its fortunes waned, Germany was forced to play a greater role.
Italy’s Regia Marina (Royal Navy) was the predominant Axis naval force in the
Mediterranean until Italy signed an armistice with the Allied powers on 3 September
1943 (made public five days later) and duly defected from the Axis. Despite myth, the
Regia Marina fought hard during the naval war in the Mediterranean and on several
occasions more than held its own against the British Royal Navy.
The United Kingdom decided to contest control of the Mediterranean for several
reasons. The primary driver was the important sea lines of communications (SLOCs)
which ran through the Mediterranean Sea from the United Kingdom to its colonial
possessions in India and the Far East. If the sea lanes through the Mediterranean were
closed, the British would be forced to use the Cape of Good Hope route around
Africa, a total distance of 12,000 miles. This route quadrupled shipping requirements
compared to the Mediterranean route and had strategic implications for Allied
capabilities and plans worldwide. In reality, though, the Mediterranean was the only
place where British forces could fight against the Axis with any hope of success. The
Royal Navy entered the war as the strongest navy in Europe and considered the Regia
Marina to be a weak opponent which would be quickly crushed. Once the Regia
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Marina was defeated, the British would have the option of seizing Italy’s Libya colony
or attacking anywhere along Europe’s southern periphery.
British hopes of quickly defeating the Regia Marina and seizing Libya were
frustrated by the stubborn resistance of the Italians and the intervention of the
Germans who contributed ground forces which restored the Axis position in Libya
and air forces which helped the Axis to strengthen its hold upon the Central
Mediterranean. Control of this area allowed the Axis to supply its forces in Libya and
closed off the Mediterranean to British shipping. It also made it increasingly difficult
for the British to supply the island of Malta. Even during the early stages of the naval
war in the Mediterranean, both sides focused on convoy operations in the Central
Mediterranean which served as a trigger for several large naval encounters.
Dating from the mid-1930s, this
photograph shows the Queen
Elizabeth-class battleship
Barham
after its 1931–34
modernization. (NH 63077
courtesy of the Naval History and
Heritage Command)
This view of
Conte di Cavour
at
Taranto in 1938 after the
completion of its rebuilding
shows the port-side 4.7in
secondary battery twin turrets
and the forward 3.9in twin turret
for anti-aircraft protection. The
device on top of the
superstructure is the main-
battery rangefinder.
(M. Brescia Collection)
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