Osprey - Duel 068 - RAF Fighters vs Luftwaffe Bombers. Battle of Britain.pdf

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RAF FIGHTERS
LUFTWAFFE BOMBERS
Battle of Britain
ANDY SAUNDERS
RAF FIGHTERS
LUFTWAFFE BOMBERS
Battle of Britain
ANDY SAUNDERS
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chronology
Design and Development
Technical Specifications
The Strategic Situation
The Combatants
Combat
Statistics and Analysis
Aftermath
Further Reading
Index
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INTRODUCTION
The iconic scenario of RAF fighter squadrons sweeping in to attack massed
formations of German bombers on the call of ‘Tally Ho!’ is very much an image that
comes to mind when one thinks of the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. To
an extent, that is how it was. However, those battles were preceded by much smaller
actions, with sections or flights from RAF fighter squadrons engaging solitary
raiders along the length of Britain’s east coast during late 1939 and early 1940. At
this early stage in the conflict, much was being learned by attackers and defenders
alike in brief thrust-and-parry skirmishes. These early engagements were, more
often-than-not, very one-sided affairs that often saw bullet-riddled Heinkel He 111s
ending their days wrecked along the east and northeast coastline or shot down into
the cold waters of the North Sea.
However, the large-scale clashes that would follow later in 1940 were far removed
from these early skirmishes, although the bombers brought down over England and
Scotland in the opening months of the
war certainly bore scars that told just
how deadly sustained attacks from
batteries of eight Browning 0.303-in.
machine guns could be. It was, though,
just the beginning. What was happening
on either side of the English Channel in
the early months of 1940 would shape
the Luftwaffe bomber force’s tactics and
RAF Fighter Command’s response.
Whilst the German bomber arm had
already begun to suffer badly at the
The first enemy aircraft brought
down on British soil was this
He 111 of KG 26, which force-
landed at Humbie, Scotland, on
28 October 1939 after being
attacked by Spitfires of Nos. 602
and 603 Sqns. (Author’s
Collection)
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hands of RAF Fighter Command
following the commencement of
Blitzkreig
operations on 10 May 1940, it
was certainly the case, thus far, that
neither side had properly assessed the
other’s strengths and weaknesses in
combat. This included proper
consideration by Luftwaffe commanders
as to how best to protect bomber
formations and, conversely, for the RAF
to work out the most effective tactics to
employ when engaging them.
Over France and the Low Countries,
the massed Luftwaffe bomber formations
were mostly engaged by Allied fighters
that were almost chancing upon the
enemy by luck rather than by any form of judgement or control. In fact, no integrated
command and control structure existed within the French air defence system under
which the RAF was then operating. When German aircraft were engaged, it was generally
the result of patrolling fighters finding the enemy, rather than being controlled onto
them. Consequently, it needed the defenders to be in the right place at the right time in
order to find and engage enemy bombers. RAF Fighter Command could not put
standing patrols constantly in the air to cover all the likely targets. This was also the
situation it subsequently faced when covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, where there
was no effective radar coverage and no ground-based command and control system.
Patrolling RAF fighters had just to hope the enemy would be encountered whilst they
were operating over the evacuation area. Thus, a degree of anticipation as to where the
Luftwaffe might next attack was required. For all of that, though, RAF fighters quickly
began to take a toll on the German bomber force. Lessons of attack and defence were
being learned by both sides.
Notwithstanding the rout of the Allies in France during the spring of 1940, RAF
Fighter Command had given a very good account of itself in terms of victories claimed
– squadrons had, however, suffered an exceedingly high attrition rate. Nevertheless,
the Luftwaffe recorded a total loss of some 1,814 aircraft (of all types) on the Western
Front from 3 September 1939 up until the Allied withdrawal from France at the end
of June. A high percentage of the combat losses in this grand total had been the result
of RAF fighter action, which, for this period, had almost exclusively involved
Hurricanes. For the same period, the RAF had lost 1,067 aircraft (of all types). At the
very least, these balance sheets give us, to a limited extent, an indication of the
successes achieved by RAF fighters against a numerically superior enemy.
As the Luftwaffe established itself on the French and Belgian coasts and faced the
British Isles, so it became possible for the Germans to mount massed and escorted
bombing raids against mainland and coastal targets. Of course, the aircraft undertaking
the early operations across the North Sea in late 1939 and early 1940 did not have the
luxury of fighter escorts. Now, at least for targets in the area of London and southeast
England, Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighters were able to give cover.
A crew member inspects
0.303-in. bullet holes in the
fuselage of a He 111 from KG 26
that managed to struggle back to
base. The unit took part in
Luftwaffe air operations in the
west, including in Norway and
during the Battle of Britain.
(Author’s Collection)
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