Air Campaign 023 - Holland 1940. The Luftwaffe's First Setback in the West (2021).pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
HOLLAND 1940
R YA N K . N O P P E N
|
The Luftwaffe’s first setback in the West
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y A D A M TO O B Y
A I R C A M PA I G N
HOLLAND 1940
The Luftwaffe’s first setback in the West
RYAN K. NOPPEN | ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
4
9
17
27
31
90
93
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Generalleutnant Kurt
Student, commander of
the Luftwaffe’s airborne
forces, inspecting his elite
Fallschirmjäger troopers
before the war. (Getty
Images)
On 27 September 1939, the day after the conclusion of the German campaign in Poland,
Adolf Hitler called together the
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces), or OKW, and chiefs of the
Heer, Kriegsmarine,
and
Luftwaffe,
and ordered
them to prepare plans for
Fall Gelb
(Case Yellow), an offensive move against the British and
French armies in Western Europe. Hitler did not want to fight a long war against the Western
Allies and believed that their forces would only grow stronger as time marched on; citing the
vulnerability of Germany’s industrial Rühr region to a potential Allied offensive once their
forces were organized, Hitler insisted on immediate offensive action in order to maintain
German initiative in the conflict. The
Oberkommando des Heeres
(Army High Command), or
OKH, drafted
Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb
(Deployment Plan No. 1, Case Yellow) for
a westward sweep across the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, bypassing the Maginot
Line but pitting German forces into a frontal attack against Allied forces in northern France.
German ground forces in the west were divided into three army groups:
Heeresgruppe B
in
the north (positioned against the Netherlands and northern Belgium),
Heeresgruppe A
in the
centre (positioned against central and southern Belgium), and
Heeresgruppe C
in the south
(covering Heeresgruppe A’s flank and the southwestern German border).
Hitler had no qualms about violating Belgian neutrality, arguing that the small nation
was involved in active defence negotiations with the French, but questioned the strategic
practicality of moving through Dutch territory. He insisted upon a revision to the original
OKH plan, authorizing German movement through the Maastricht Strip, a narrow strip
of Dutch territory running north-to-south along the River Maas for roughly 50km along
the Belgian eastern border down to the city of Maastricht, but with a political arrangement
to be worked out with the Dutch government; Dutch territory was not to be occupied and
Dutch neutrality was to be maintained. Halder unveiled the amended Aufmarschanweisung
N°2, Fall Gelb, which excluded the occupation of Dutch territory on 29 October 1939.
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe
(Luftwaffe supreme commander) Hermann Göring and
Chef des Generalstabs der Luftwaffe
(Luftwaffe chief-of-staff )
Generalmajor
Hans Jeschonnek
5
were immediately alarmed at the omission
of the Netherlands from the territory to
be occupied in the revised plan for Fall
Gelb, fearing that the British would not
hesitate to violate Dutch neutrality in
order for the Royal Air Force to make use
of Dutch airfields for attacks on targets
in the Rühr. Jeschonnek went to see
Hitler on 30 October and unsuccessfully
tried to convince him to again make the
Netherlands a target of Fall Gelb.
Hitler hoped to launch Fall Gelb on
12 November but poor weather compelled
its postponement (Fall Gelb would
ultimately be postponed 20 times for
various reasons between 12 November 1939
and 10 May 1940); this postponement
allowed Jeschonnek more time to plead
his case for the Netherlands to Hitler. The
threat of British use of Dutch airfields as
well as Jeschonnek’s additional argument
that the Dutch themselves were not fully
capable of preventing British overflights
of Dutch territory en route to targets in
the Rühr finally persuaded Hitler to again
earmark Dutch territory for occupation.
On 15 November at Hitler’s prompting,
OKW issued new instructions that the occupation of as much Dutch territory as possible for
the purpose of securing the air defence of the Rühr was now a priority for the army in Fall
Gelb. OKH felt at the time it could only spare the X.Armeekorps (at the time two infantry
divisions and the army’s sole cavalry division) from the 18.Armee, the force responsible for
covering the German northern flank in the West, and several armoured trains for operations
against the Netherlands; OKH concluded that these units could occupy Dutch territory
leading up to the
Grebbelinie
(Grebbe Line) in the central Netherlands and territory south
of the River Maas; this excluded the area of the Netherlands referred to as
Vesting Holland
(Fortress Holland).
The Dutch defences
It is necessary at this point to briefly discuss the Dutch defensive positions and geographical
barriers facing German army planners at the time. The Grebbelinie was a modern defence
line, made up of trenches and concrete bunkers, running north-to-south from the Ijsselmeer
to just east of the town of Rhenen on the Rhine River and then southward to Ochten on
the Waal River and ending near Appeltern on the Maas. To the south beginning at the town
of Grave on the Maas was the
Peel-Raamstelling
(Peel-Raam Position), a lighter defence line
of pillboxes, barbed wire, and peat marshes running south and west to the Belgian border
near the town of Weert.
To the west of the Grebbeline was the
Waterlinie
(Waterline), running north-to-south from
the Ijsselmeer through Utrecht and across the Rhine, Waal, and Maas. The Waterline, the
traditional defensive line protecting the provinces of Holland and Zeeland since the Golden
Age of the seventeenth century, ran along the easternmost part of the country below sea level
Generalmajor Hans
Jeschonnek (right), the
Luftwaffe’s chief-of-staff,
was the primary
proponent of the complete
occupation of the
Netherlands as the
German high command
planned its invasion of the
West. Jeschonnek
convinced his superior,
Hermann Göring (left),
that German control of
Dutch airfields had to be
immediately accomplished
at the outset of the
offensive or risk the threat
of the British Royal Air
Force occupying them and
using them for raids
against the Rühr industrial
basin. (Getty Images)

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