Combat 033 - US Airborne Soldier vs German Soldier. Sicily, Normandy, and Operation Market Garden, 1943–44.pdf

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US Airborne Soldier
VERSUS
German Soldier
David Campbell
Sicily, Normandy, and Operation
Market Garden,
1943–44
US Airborne Soldier
German Soldier
David Campbell
Sicily, Normandy, and
Operation
Market Garden,
1943–44
Illustrated by Steve Noon
INTRODUCTION
THE OPPOSING SIDES
BIAZZA RIDGE
July 11, 1943
Origins and doctrine • Recruitment and morale • Weaponry, training, and tactics
Command, control, and communications
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8
30
42
56
70
74
76
78
80
LA FIÈRE
June 6–7, 1944
NIJMEGEN
ANALYSIS
September 19–20, 1944
Sicily • Normandy • Nijmegen
AFTERMATH
UNIT ORGANIZATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Introduction
US paratroopers, likely from
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin
Vandervoort’s 2d Battalion,
505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment (2/505th), stand
guard over wounded German
soldiers at the Waalbrug road
bridge in the Netherlands
during Operation
Market
Garden.
Though the idea of
using parachute troops to
make dramatic incursions
into enemy territory had been
present in most of the major
military powers throughout
the 1930s, the US decision
to develop an airborne
capability was (like the
British endeavors) essentially
reactive. The exploits of
German
Fallschirmjäger
during the fall of France
and the Low Countries in
May–June 1940 showed off
their daring tactical utility,
while the assault on Crete
in May 1941 demonstrated
the strategic potential of
such forces when employed
boldly and on a large
scale. (© Hulton-Deutsch
Collection/CORBIS/Corbis via
Getty Images)
The men who made up America’s parachute regiments in World War II were
some of the best the US Army had to offer; privates in an airborne unit often
had the intelligence and initiative that would make them candidates for NCO
positions in the regular infantry, their sergeants had to be able to do their own
job as well as those of their fellow NCOs and the junior officers that led them,
and their officers of all grades had a reputation for hard work and leading
from the front – a fact reflected in their casualty figures.
From the outset US paratroop formations justifiably considered themselves
an elite, though it would take a little time for their operational capabilities
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to be fully realized, not least because many in the regular Army were none
too enamored of the idea of “elite” units in general, especially ones that
were so costly to train, equip, and deploy. Nevertheless, the extremely high
quality of the parachute infantry regiments allowed them to compensate for
early operational mistakes, and once the lessons of those mistakes had been
fully absorbed they provided the Army with a strategic capability that could
threaten any part of the Axis front with envelopment from the air.
The Germans had made the running in airborne warfare in the first
years of the war, but as the Wehrmacht gradually turned from offensive
to defensive operations, it became clear that it would have to find some
system for dealing with prospective enemy incursions from the sky.
Airborne operations promised great things, but the very boldness of their
execution could also be their greatest weakness. Generalfeldmarschall Albert
Kesselring thought that
An air landing, more so than any operation on the ground, is a thrust into unknown
territory. The conventional means of reconnaissance and sources of information offer
inadequate results and require a great deal of time. From the moment the airborne
troops land, they face surprises against which they are not protected by advance
reconnaissance and security measures and from which they are no longer able to
escape. Consequently, every airborne operation involves a greater risk than ordinary
ground combat, requires more time for preparation, and entails a distinct moment
of weakness during the first phase of landing. (PAM 20-232 1951: 40–41)
A German soldier relaxes
after receiving first aid
and a cigarette from a
member of a medical unit
of the 82d Airborne Division
during the first week of the
Normandy campaign. The
performance of German
units in Normandy and the
Netherlands was impressive,
with many fighting more
tenaciously than their
composition would suggest,
often relying upon their
small core of veterans to
keep things functioning. The
Germans understood that,
rather than disband such
battle-hardened forces, it was
better to let them operate
as reduced
Kampfgruppen,
leavened with drafts of
replacements to keep the
fighting strength up until the
time came to withdraw them
from the line for a proper rest
and full refitting. (Photo12/
UIG/Getty Images)
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