2011-07-10, Matthijs R. Koot Using Google, I made a list of 84 .gov.ir domains (Iranian govt) and counted the occurrences of Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail accounts (US companies) used as Whois contact e-mail for those domains. Result: 61 (!) occurrences over 54 (!) .gov.ir. domains. I was astounded. Admittedly, Iran could easily recover from Whois-level domain hijacking because they control whois.nic.ir (nic.ir itself only has @nic.ir contacts), but they currently leave a window of opportunity. 0 ad.gov.ir 0 aiiri.gov.ir 1 amol.gov.ir 1 aranbidgol.gov.ir 1 ardestan.gov.ir 0 ashayer-ks.gov.ir 1 atf.gov.ir 0 behdasht.gov.ir 1 bijar.gov.ir 0 cobi.gov.ir 1 damavand.gov.ir 1 divanealee.gov.ir 0 ea-customs.gov.ir 0 ea-imo.gov.ir 0 easabt.gov.ir 2 eocr.gov.ir 1 farhang.gov.ir 1 farhang-ks.gov.ir 1 fcc.gov.ir 2 fereydan.gov.ir 1 fereydoonshahr.gov.ir 1 ghorveh.gov.ir 0 gilanmaskan.gov.ir 1 golbahar-ntoir.gov.ir 1 golestan.gov.ir 2 golpayegan.gov.ir 0 health.gov.ir 1 icm.gov.ir 1 ict.gov.ir 0 iieda.gov.ir 1 ilamcustoms.gov.ir 0 irica.gov.ir 0 irtr.gov.ir 0 isc.gov.ir 1 isfahan.gov.ir 2 isfcustoms.gov.ir 1 kamyaran.gov.ir 0 karafarini.gov.ir 1 karaj.gov.ir 1 khansar.gov.ir 0 khcu.gov.ir 0 khoorbiabanak.gov.ir 1 khorrambid.gov.ir 1 ksh-behzisty.gov.ir 2 lenjan.gov.ir 1 maph.gov.ir 0 marivan.gov.ir 1 mefa.gov.ir 1 mfa.gov.ir 1 mhud.gov.ir 1 mianeh.gov.ir 1 mim.gov.ir 0 mimresearch.gov.ir 0 mlsa.gov.ir 0 moc.gov.ir 1 mohme.gov.ir 1 najafabad.gov.ir 1 natanz.gov.ir 0 ntoir.gov.ir 1 ostan-ag.gov.ir 2 ostan-as.gov.ir 0 qazvin.gov.ir 0 qazvin-oefa.gov.ir 1 razavimet.gov.ir 0 refah.gov.ir 0 research.gov.ir 1 robatkarim.gov.ir 2 sabtyazd.gov.ir 1 sarvabad.gov.ir 1 sbs.gov.ir 1 semirom.gov.ir 1 shabestar.gov.ir 1 shahreza.gov.ir 1 shahriyar.gov.ir 1 shemiran.gov.ir 1 tazirat.gov.ir 0 tco.gov.ir 0 teh-coop.gov.ir 1 tehran.gov.ir 0 tri.gov.ir 1 varamin.gov.ir 0 women.gov.ir 1 yco.gov.ir 1 zabol.gov.ir
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